Noah Schimenti
Ph.D. Candidate Political Science University of Nebraska-Lincoln
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Research and Teaching Interests: International Relations, Comparative Politics, Authoritarian Regimes, Conflict Resolution, Violent Non-State Actors, Corruption
Dissertation Title: Corrupt, Control, Repress: The Authoritarian Playbook
Dissertation Chair: Dr. Alice Kang
About me:
I am a sixth-year Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln with an expected graduation date of May 2026. I have a strong record of teaching success with a diverse range of subject matter, delivery methods, and class size. In an online format, I have served as Instructor of Record for Political Science 100: Power & Politics in America & Political Science 108: Political Ideas. In-person I have been the Instructor of Record for National Security Studies 175: Introduction to National Security. These experiences show I am willing and eager to engage as a mentor, advisor, and instructor.
Broadly speaking, I’m interested in understanding political behavior in contexts where democratic accountability is weak. In my research I explore competition for power, resources, and control within authoritarian, and conflict-ridden states. My research is comprised of three strains of political behavior: Corruption, Control, and Conflict Resolution. I employ a wide range of quantitative and qualitative methods to evaluate my theories.
Corruption In “Cabinet Turnover in Authoritarian Regimes: Assisting or Hindering Corruption?” I address cabinet composition in authoritarian regimes, exploring the role of tenure in the development of corruption networks.
Control: In my study “Civil Society and Opposition Seat Share in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes” I examine the interaction between anti-system CSOs and opposition parties, identifying mechanisms through which these CSOs affect opposition party success.
Conflict Resolution: My study “Power Sharing, Cabinet Composition, and Corruption” explores how rebel inclusion in power sharing arrangements facilitates corruption and prevents the emergence of good governance following civil wars. Further, I have coauthored the study “Power, Signaling, and Credibility: Terrorist Group Alliances and the Bargaining Range for Peace” currently revise and resubmit status, arguing that terrorist groups engaging in alliance behavior with other violent non-state actors leads to a higher likelihood of signing a peace settlement with the state.